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DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

I. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

This

Case

disability

before

originated
the

with

Industrial

Worker's Compensation Act.

a

claim

Commission

for
of

permanent
Utah

under

total
the

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah

Code Annotated Section 35-1-83.

II.

(1)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the Industrial Commission err as a matter of law when

it applied the 1984 Amendment to Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69

in allocating permanent total disability and reirabursement liability
between

the

Second

Injury

Fund

on

the

one

hand

and

the

employer/carrier on the other?

III.

STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE

Utah Code Annotated

Section

35-1-69

(as amended. 1984). the

full text of which is set forth in the Addendum.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(a) Nature of the Case.
Sylvia

Pellegrini

Systems in June 1983.
Commission

alleging

sustained

an

industrial

injury with Wicat

She filed an application with the Industrial

permanent

total disability from the accident.

She had pre-existing impairments.

The parties stipulated that she

was permanently and totally disabled.
to the impairment ratings.

The parties also stipulated

The only issue for adjudication was the

apportionment between the employer and the Second Injury Fund.
(b)

Course of Proceedings.

On January 2. 1987. Sylvia Pellegrini filed an application with
the

Industrial

disability.

(R.

Commission
at

31-32)

of

Utah

Following

alleging
a

permanent

prehearing

total

attorneys1

conference. (R. 49, 50.) the Administrative Law Judge entered his

2

Order on December 29, 1987.
Administrative

Law

Plaintiffs moved for the review of the

Judge's

Order

on

the

ground

that

the

apportionment between the employer and the Second Injury Fund should
have been on the basis of Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69 as it
existed prior to the 1984 Amendment.
(c)

Disposition Below.

On March 14, 1988, the Industrial Commission of Utah entered an
Order

denying

Review,

Wicat

Systems1

and

Hartford

Insurance's Motion

for

(R. at 65-66) holding that the allocation was proper under

the 1984 Amendment to Section 35-1-69.
(d)

Statement of the Facts.

1.

On June 21, 1983, while employed by Wicat Systems, Sylvia

Pellegrini injured her wrist while lifting a tray rack.
2.
and

Wicat Systems and Hartford Insurance paid medical expenses

temporary

total

disability

and

permanent

partial

disability

benefits to the applicant for which they now seek reimbursement from
the Second Injury Fund.
3.
for

On April

permanent

10. 1987. Mrs. Pellegrini

total

disability

with

the

filed

Industrial

an

application

Commission of

Utah.
4.
whole

The parties stipulated

person

permanent

that Mrs. Pellegrini (a) had a 46%

impairment

for conditions existing prior to

1980 and an additional 12% whole person permanent

impairment for a

condition arising between 1980 and the industrial incident of 1983;

3

(c)

ana

a

industrial

24% whole
accident.

person
The

permanent

parties

impairment

stipulated

for

also

Pellegrinis knee was permanently and totally disabled.
5.

The

parties

could

not

agree

on

the

her

1983

that

Mrs.

(R. 50)

apportionment

of

liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund.
6.
Utah

The Administrative Law Judge applied the 1984 Amendment to

Code

Annotated

Section

35-1-69

in

apportioning

liability

between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, holding that the
Amendment was remedial or procedural in nature and therefore, had
application

to

the

proceedings

in

this

action

which

instituted after the 1984 Amendment to that Section.
the Administrative

Law Judge assessed

the employer

were

all

In so doing,
liability for

24/64ths or 37.5% of Mrs. Pellegrini's permanent total disability
award for the first 312 weeks.
40/64ths

or

62.5%

of

the

The Second Injury Fund was assessed

first

312 weeks

and

was

ordered

to

reimburse the employer for 62.5% of all medical expenses.
7.

On January 14. 1988. Wicat Systems and Hartford Insurance

filed a Motion for Review of the Administrative Law Judge's Order on
the

ground

that

the

apportionment

between

the employer

and the

Second Injury Fund should have been made pursuant to the provision
of Section 35-1-69 prior to the 1984 Amendment.
8.

In its March 14. 1988 Order denying the Motion for Review,

the Industrial Commission of Utah Stated:
The Commission finds the only issue on review is the

4

proper manner in which to figure the proportionate shares
of the Second Injury Fund and the Carrier. The Commission
finds the Administrative Law Judge correctly figured the
proportionate shares per the provisions of the amended
statute. U.C.A. 35-1-69. The Commission views the 1984
amendment as a procedural amendment and therefore finds
that it is retroactive in nature and applies to all
injuries adjudicated after passage of the amendment. . . .
That amendment specifies that the percentage impairment
attributable to the carrier is figured on an uncorabined
basis, while the overall impairment is figured on a
combined basis.
(R. at 65-66.)
9.

On April

8. 1988. Wicat

Systems and Hartford Insurance

petitioned this Court for a review of the March 14, 1988 Order of
the Industrial Commission denying their Motion for Review.

(R. at

68-69.)

V.

The
properly

Administrative
applied

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Law

Judge

the 1984 Amendment

and

the

Industrial

to Section 35-1-69

Commission
in their

allocation of liability between the employer and the Second Injury
Fund in this controversy.

VI.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE APPLICATION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE
REMEDIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 1984 AMENDMENT TO SECTION
35-1-69 WAS NEITHER IMPROPER NOR UNREASONABLE IN THE

5

ALLOCATION OF LIABILITY BETWEEN THE EMPLOYER AND THE
SECOND INJURY FUND,
It is the position of the Industrial Commission and the Second
Injury Fund that the 1984 Amendment to Section 35-1-69 was remedial
in nature to resolve the confusion resulting from the Supreme Court
decisions in the Northwest Carriers. Inc. v. Industrial Commission
in the Merz case. 639 P. 2d 138

(December

1981) and Kerans v.

Industrial Commission. 713 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1985) on the one hand, and
Jacobsen Construction v. Hair. 667 P. 2d 25 (Utah 1983) on the other
hand, with respect to apportionment of disability benefits between
the

employer

and

the

Second

Injury

Fund

.

In

support

of its

position that the 1984 Amendment to Section 35-1-69 was remedial in
nature, defendant

refers

to the recent

opinion of this Court in

Edward Alter v. Hales. Sand Se Gravel and/or Workers1 Compensation
Fund of Utah filed November 23. 1987. (Attached as Addendum, Exhibit
A) in which this Court used the following language:
A remedial statute is one "That is designed to correct an
existing law. redress an existing grievance, or introduce
regulations conducive to the public good." Blacks Law
Dictionary. 1163 (5th Ed. 1983).
The changes to the
statute made in HB208 appear to be remedial. The changes
"redress an existing grievance" held by Mr. Hales and his
insurer. The legislature, in passing the Bill, must have
intended "to correct an existing law" and must have
believed
the
changes
would
"introduce
regulations
conducive to the public good."
This Court further referred to 73 Am. Jur. 2d statute Section
11 (1974) describing remedial statutes as follows:
Legislation which has been regarded as remedial in its
nature includes statutes which abridge superfluities of

6

former laws, remedying defects therein. or mischiefs
thereof, whether the previous dificulties were statutory
or were patt of the common law. Remedial legislation
implies an intention to reform or extend existing rights,
and has fot its purpose the promotion of justice and
advancement of public welfare and of important and
beneficial public objects. The term applies to a statute
giving a party a remedy where he had none, or different
one. before. Another common use of the term "remedial
statute" is to distinguish it from a statute conferring a
substantive right.
This Court also alluded to "Moore v. American Coal Company. 737
P. 2d 989. 990 (Utah 1987). where the Supreme Court wrote:
However, a statute that is procedural or remedial is
applied to all cases arising after the effective date of
the
statute
and
to pending
and
accrued
actions.
Procedural statutes that do not "enlarge eliminate, or
destroy vested and contractual rights" are applied to
pending actions.
Applying the language of this Court in the Hales. Sand & Gravel
case, supra, the Industrial Commission properly found that the 1984
Amendment

to Section 35-1-69 was remedial in nature and. as such.

applied to this action which was initiated after the passage of the
1984 Amendment.
clarify

the

The effect of the remedial statute amendment was to

confusion

and

uncertainly

engendered

by

the

cases

referred to above and to provide a method certain for the allocation
of

liability

between the employer

and

the Second Injury Fund in

cases involving whole-man impairment caused by industrial injury on
the one hand and combined impairment caused by the combination of
the

industrial

hand.

injury

and

pre-existing

impairments

on the other

In this case, such application resulted in the assessment by

the Industrial Commission of the whole-man impairment found by the

7

medical panel to be attributable to the industrial injury i.e. . .
24%

whole

person

impairment.

as

against

the

overall

combined

impairment of 64% whole person, for 37.5% of the applicant's initial
312 weeks of permanent total disability benefits, with the Second
Injury Fund responsible for the 62.5% remaining portion as set forth
in the statute.
Defendant

is well aware of

the Supreme Court's

language in

Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 704 P. 2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985)
that " . . .

In Workers' Compensation cases the benefits to be

awarded to an injured worker are to be determined on the basis of
the law as it existed at the time of the injury."

The application

by the Industrial Commission in this case of the 1984 Amendment to
Section 35-1-69 is wholly consistent with that statement and with
the Marshall
permanent
applying

case.

total

injured worker will

disability

entitlement.

1984

Amendment

compensation

benefits

from

contribution

of

rating

the

The

the

the industrial

in accordance with

the

Indeed.

injured

employer
injury

receive his maximum

worker

based

on

in

will
the

to the combined

the legislative

all

cases
receive

whole-man
impairment

intent as held by the

Supreme Court in the Karens case where the Supreme Court held (713
P. 2d at 53) that " . . .
entitled
ratings".

We. therefore, hold that plaintiff is

to compensation on the basis of the whole-man impairment
Here again,

it

is defendant's

position

that

the 1984

Amendment as applied by the Commission in this case as well as all

8

others arising after March 29. 1984 requires that the injured worker
be paid by the employer

for his industrial injury on a whole-man

impairment basis and provides a uniform and consistent basis for the
handling of all disability cases involving a compensable combination
of

impairment

from

the

industrial

injury

on

the

pre-existing injuries or conditions on the other.

one

hand

and

Such uniformity

and consistency protect completely the rights of the injured worker
and,

in

addition,

comply

completely

"remedial statute11 as set forth above.
a

remedial

existing

statute
law,

and

redress

is one
an

with

definitions

of a

The 1984 Amendment indeed is

"that

is designed

existing

grievance,

regulations conducive to the public good."
supra.

the

to correct an
or

introduce

Blacks Law Dictionary,

It is also a statute "which abridges superfluities of former

laws, remedying defects therein, or mischiefs thereof, whether the
previous dificulties were statutes or were part of the common law"
as set forth in the definition found in 73 Am. Jur. 2d Section 11
(1974)

describing

remedial

statutes.

Thus,

the

1984

Statutory

Amendment to Section 35-1-69, having been determined to be remedial
in nature, must be applied to all cases arising after the effective
date of the statute and to pending and accrued actions.
v. American Coal Company 737 P. 2d at 990 (Utah 1987).
controversy

arose after

Industrial

Commission

allocation of

the enactment
properly

of

applied

See Moore
Since this

the 1984 Amendment
its

provisions

to

the
the

liability made between the employer and the Second

Injury Fund.
9

VII.

The 1984 Amendment

CONCLUSION

to Section 35-1-69 was remedial in nature

and therefore is properly applicable to the allocation of liability
between

the

controversy.

employer
The

and

the

Industrial

Second

Commission

provisions of that 1984 Amendment

Injury
properly

Fund

in

applied

this
the

in accordance with the language

and the intent of the amendatory provisions.

The contention by the

employer that the Commission as a matter of law improperly applied
the amendatory provisions of the 1984 statute to this controversy is
untenable.

The

Order

of

the

Industrial

Commission,

should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.

/

^uS^?Hfie V. Boorman

7

attorney for defendant
Second I n j u r y Fund

10

therefore,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on.
a copies of the attached

September

/ - *

. 1988

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT SECOND INJURY FUND

was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:

Stuart L. Poelman. SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU. 10 Exchange
Place. 11th Floor. P. O. Box 45000. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145
Industrial Commission of Utah. Attention:

Barbara Elicerio

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

11

Y,^^^^^-~yC^t^^^^-

ADDENDUM

35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in permanent incapacity— Payment out of Second Injury Fund —
Training of employee.
(1) If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by
accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury
for which either compensation or medical care, or both, is provided by this
chapter that results in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater
than he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or
which aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, compensation, medical care, and other related items as outlined in Section 35-1-81,
shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but the liability of the
employer for such compensation, medical care, and other related items shall
be for the industrial injury only. The remainder shall be paid out of the
Second Im'urv Fund provided for in Subsection 35-1-68 (1). and shall be determined after assigning the impairment for the industrial injury on a whole
person uncbmbined basis and then deducting this percentage from the total
combined rating. This. combined impairment rating may not exceed 100%.
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation of a pre-existing injury,
disease, or congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis
of the combined injuries as provided in this Subsection (1), and (b) where there
is no such aggravation, no award for combined injuries may be made unless
the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrialjinjury is, 10%,or greater and the percentage of permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions, including the industrial
injury, is greater than 20%. In determining the impairment thresholds and
assessment of liability in favor of the employee and apportionment between
the carrier or employer and the Second Injury Fund, the permanent physical
impairment attributable to the industrial injury or the pre-existing condition
or overall impairment, shall be considered on a whole person uncombined
basis. If the pre-existing incapacity referred to in this Subsection (l)(b) previously has.been compensated for, in whole or in part, as a permanent partial
disability under this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Law, such compensation shall be deductedfrom the liability assessed to the Second Injury Fund under this paragraph.
If the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical expenses, or othei
related items are required as a result of the industrial injury subject to thi.«
80

WUKKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-69

section, the employer or its insurance carrier shallbe responsible for all such
temporary benefits, medical care, or other related items up to the end of the
period of temporary total disability resulting from the industrial'ixyury.'*Any
allocation of disability benefits, medical care, or other related items following
such period shall be made between the employer or its insurer and the Second
Injury Fund as provided for in this section, and any payments made by the
employer or its insurance carrier in excess of its proportionate share shall be
recoverable at the time of the award for combined disabilities if any is made.
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical panel set forth in
Section 35-2-56, shall review all medical aspects of the case and. determine
first, the total permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes 'and conditions including the industrial injury; second/the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury; and third, the
percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the'previously
existing condition, whether due to accidental injury, disease, or congenital
causes. The Industrial Commission shall then assess the liability for permanent partial disability compensation and future medical care to the employer
on the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable
to the industrial injury only and any amounts remaining to be paid shall'be
payable out of the Second Injury Fund. Medical expenses shall be paid in the
first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier. Amounts, if any, which
have been paid by the employer in excess of the portion attributable to the
industrial injury shall be reimbursed to the employer out of the Second Iiyury
Fund upon written request and verification of amounts so expended. •*
(2) The commission may increase the weekly compensation rates to be paid
out of this special fund. This increase shall be used for the rehabilitation and
training of any employee coming under this chapter as may be certified to the
commission by the Rehabilitation Department of the^State Board of Education
as being eligible for rehabilitation and training. There may not be paid out of
such special fund for rehabilitation an amount in excess of $1,000.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 79; C.L. 1917, of subsec. (1); inserted the second and third
§ 3140, subsec. 6; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. paragraphs of subsec. (1); inserted "permanent
1933 & Co 1943, 42-1-65; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; partial disability" in the second sentence of the
1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. last paragraph of subsec. (1); inserted "future"
55, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; in the second sentence of the last paragraph of
1969, ch. 86, § 7; 1973, ch. 67, § 6; 1981, ch. subsec. (1); substituted "any amounts remain287, § 4; 1984, ch. 79, § 1.
ing to be paid hereunder" in the second senCompiler's Notes. — The 1981 amendment tence of the last paragraph of subsec. (l).for
substituted "either compensation or medical "the remainder"; inserted the provisions of the
care, or both" in the first paragraph of subsec. present third sentence of the fourth paragraph
(1) for "compensation and medical care"; in- of subsec. (1); inserted "upon written request
serted "or which aggravates or is aggravated and verification of amounts so expended":in
by such pre-existing incapacity" in the first the last sentence of the last paragraph of
paragraph of subsec. (1); substituted "compen- subsec. (1); and made minor changes in phrasesation, medical care and other related items as ology and punctuation.'
outlined" in the first paragraph of subsec. (1) - The 1984'amendment substituted "chapter"
for "compensation and medical care, which for "title" in the first sentence of subsec. (1);
medical care and other related items are out- added "and shall be determined after assigning
lined"; inserted "and other related items" be- the impairment for the industrial iiyury on a
fore "shall be" in the first paragraph of subsec. whole person uncombined basis and then de(1); substituted "second injury fund" in the first ducting this percentage from the total, comand last paragraphs of subsec. (1) for "special bined rating" to the second sentence of subsec.
fund"; deleted "hereinafter referred to as the ((1); added, the third sentence to subsec. (1); in'sDeciaLfund"' at the end of the first paragraph - serted the second sentence in the!second para-

ADDENDUM - EXHIBIT A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Edward Alter, State Treasurer
and Custodian of the Uninsured
Employers1 Fund and the
Industrial Commission of Utah,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Hales Sand and Gravel and/or
Workers Compensation Fund
of Utah,

Case No. 870013-CA

Defendants and Appellants.
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Orme.

FILED
NOV 2 31987
Timothy M. Shea

DAVIDSON,

Judge:

Cisrk cf the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Defendants appeal from the Industrial Commissions denial
of their motion for review of the administrative law judge's
order requiring them to pay into the Uninsured Employers' Fund
the sum mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2)(a) (1986). We
reverse.
Randi Hales was fatally injured, as a result of an
accident arising out of or in the course of her employment with
defendant Hales Sand and Gravel (Hales), on July 31, 1986. At
the time of her death, Randi was 17 years old, had never
married, and had no dependents. Defendant Hales was insured by
defendant Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. That fund
accepted liability to the Industrial Commission for the no
dependent death benefit provided for in § 33-1-68(2)(a). The
temporary death benefits order was entered by the
administrative law judge on August 21, 1986, directing the sum
of $3.0,000.00 be paid to the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
Defendant Hales' motion for review was received by the
Industrial Commission on September 9, 1986, as was a similar
motion from Randi's mother. Both motions were denied and this
appeal followed.

During the time this matter was proceeding, the father of
the decedent, who owns defendant Hales Sand and Gravel, sought
relief through the legislative process. Through his efforts,
H.B. 208 was drafted and presented to the Utah Legislature.
His lobbying efforts contributed substantially to its passage.
On March 16, 1987, the bill was signed into law by the
Governor. The new l?.w eliminated the payment of death benefits
to the Uninsured Employers* Fund when a decedent left no
dependents and provided alternative sources of funding. It
became effective on July 1, 1987, eleven months after Randi's
death. Defendants now argue that the changes to the law are
remedial and therefore control this action.
A remedial statute is one ••that is designed to correct an
existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce
regulations conducive to the public good." Black1s Law
Dictionary 1163 (5th ed. 1983). The changes to the statute
made in H.B. 208 appear to be remedial. The changes "redress
an existing grievance" held by Mr. Hales and his insurer. The
legislature, in passing the bill, must have intended "to
correct an existing law" and must have believed the changes
would "introduce regulations conducive to the public good."1
In Moore v. American Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah
1987), the Court wrote:
In workers* compensation cases, we
determine the rights and liabilities of
the parties as of the date when the
accident at issue occurred.
However, a statute that is procedural or
remedial is applied to all cases arising
after the effective date of the statute
and to pending and accrued actions.
Procedural statutes that do not "enlarge,
1. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 11 (1974) describes remedial
statutes as follows:
Legislation which has been regarded as remedial in its nature
includes statutes which abridge superfluities of former laws,
remedying defects therein, or mischiefs thereof, whether the
previous difficulties were statutory or were part of the
common law. Remedial legislation implies an intention to
reform or extend existing rights, and has for its purpose the
promotion of justice and the advancement of public welfare and
of .important and beneficial public objects. The term applies
to a statute giving a party a remedy where he had none, or a
different one, before. Another common use of the term
"remedial statute" is to distinguish it from a statute
conferring a substantive right.
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eliminate, or destroy vested or
contractual rights1* are applied to
pending actions.
(Citations omitted)(quoting State, Deo't of Social Sarv. v.
Hioos. 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982))•
"An action is deemed to be pending from 1 he time o*: its
commencement until its final determination uron appeal, or
until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is
sooner satisfied*" Hiacrs. 656 P.2d at 1002 (quoting Boucofski
v, Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 120 (1909)). If this
action commenced with the temporary order, it was pending when
the new law took effect on July 1, 1987. The new statute,
being remedial in nature, applies to the action. The effect is
to change the method of funding and to eliminate defendants'
liability for the $30,000.00 no dependent payment. The
temporary order must therefore be voided.
The changes in the law may also be considered procedural
because they change the method of funding the Uninsured
Employers' Fund. If this is the case, the new law will be
applied since no "vested or contractual rights" are held by the
Industrial Commission until one year after the date of death;
until July 31, 1987, one month after the new law took effect on
July 1, 1987.
Because of our holding, it is not n^^essary to discuss the
second issue raised by defendants.
The ruling of the Industrial Commission is reversed and the
case is remanded for administrative action in accordance with
the above.
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything significant
to existing law and hence is not to be published in the Utah or
Pacific Reporter.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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